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I. Introduction  
The integration of Darwin’s theory, and later the neo-Darwinian synthesis, into the 
modern scientific world view was probably the most challenging intellectual endeavor 
of the last century. It reflects the overwhelming success of the “Darwinian revolution” 
(Ruse 1979) in the sciences. However, some questions remain. One that will be dis-
cussed here relates to the role which a Darwinian world view offers for understanding 
evolution as a general phenomenon. Evolution is not specific to the realm of nature. 
Phenomena of evolution also occur in other domains. The social sciences are a case in 
point. What is the relevance of Darwinism, e.g., for understanding societal evolution? 
Early attempts at applying Darwinian thought to the human society resulted in Social 
Darwinism (Hawkins 1997). This proved to be a misinterpretation with disastrous 
consequences. For long time this experience made many social scientists reluctant to 
even consider the possibility of a connection between Darwinian thought and the so-
cial sciences.  
 These discouraging experiences not withstanding, the issue deserves attention, gi-
ven the enormous impact of Darwinism on modern scientific thought. It can be dealt 
with in a more abstract way (which, as far as the social sciences are concerned, is less 
prone to the fallacies of Social Darwinism) by asking whether Darwinian concepts are 
sufficiently general to explain evolutionary processes wherever they are thought to oc-
cur. There is a strong tendency nowadays to explicitly or implicitly answer this ques-
tion in the affirmative. Many writers openly or tacitly borrow from evolutionary biolo-
gy. It has become something of “the” model for evolutionary theorizing in many dis-
ciplines, and the neo-Darwinian approach to evolution in nature has in the meantime 
mutated to “Universal Darwinism” (Dawkins 1983). 
 However, as will be argued in this paper, for understanding phenomena of evolu-
tion outside the domain of biology, such an approach is neither necessary nor does it 
seem well suited. The idea that Universal Darwinism has identified the generic featu-
res of evolution can be contested. To make that point, the case of the social sciences, 
and more specifically, of economics will be discussed exemplarily. Since neo-
Darwinian theory could be considered relevant at several levels in the economic do-
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main, a rather complex argument will be necessary, one which results in the hypot-
hesis of an ontological continuity of evolution. Section II prepares the ground by brie-
fly reviewing some attempts to come to grips with the role which evolution plays in 
economics. In this light, Section III discusses the concepts for explaining evolution 
suggested by Universal Darwinism and develops an alternative approach to identifying 
the generic features of evolution. Section IV elaborates on the epistemological impli-
cations of those generic features and some of their methodological consequences. Sec-
tion V then returns to the question of what relevance can be attributed to Darwinian 
thought in the trans-disciplinary approach taken here. Section VI offers some conclu-
sions.  
II. Responses in Economics to the Challenge of Darwinism 
The influence of contemporary Darwinian thought on the first efforts to conceive an 
evolutionary approach to economics more than a century ago is quite obvious. Thors-
tein Veblen, then a widely read author, published an article with the provocative title 
“Why is Economics not an Evolutionary Science?” (Veblen 1898). His article was mo-
re of a criticism of the static economic theory of his time than an outline of an alterna-
tive evolutionary program. Nevertheless, in later work, Veblen (1899, 1914) tried to 
reconstruct and interpret the anthropological record of how institutions and technolo-
gies had developed from a primitive state of human society. As he had already posited 
in his programmatic article, to him the historical change in man-made evolution was 
cumulative and followed the path of the evolution of the habits of thought. Unfortu-
nately, despite his impressive elaboration of the historical process inspired by the 
scientific ideals of the German historical school (cf. Hodgson 2001), Veblen failed to 
provide a systematic theoretical account of economic evolution and its relationship to 
Darwinian theory1.  
 While Veblen’s approach to evolutionary economics was clearly inspired by a Dar-
winian world view, the other early attempt to address the issue was explicitly anti-
Darwinian. It was undertaken by Joseph Schumpeter in his influential theory of eco-
nomic development (Schumpeter 1912/34). He denied Darwinism any relevance for 
understanding economic evolution, in fact, he even avoided using the term “evolu-
tion” in this context. The inspiration for his approach seems to have come from anot-
her major intellectual controversy of the time, namely the debate on Marx’s theory of 
a crisis-prone capitalist development of the economy (which may be subsumed to the 
class of pre-Darwinian evolutionary thought). The growth process in the period of 
“promoterism” in Europe in the late 19th and early 20th century had created previously 
unknown forms of economic reality in production, consumption, exchange, and even 
in the institutional set up of the economy. In Schumpeter’s view, theorizing about ca-
pitalist development would be pointless, if it failed to take account of innovations and 
the role of entrepreneurship. Since he rejected biological analogies, Schumpeter had to 
                                                   
1 Cf. Rutherford (1998). The theoretical deficit left the school which Veblen founded (American Institutionalism) so-
mewhat disoriented and was never compensated in that school -- perhaps one of the reasons for why this first at-
tempt to establish “evolutionary economics” was later lost from sight (Hodgson 1999, Chap. 5). 
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find a way to make sense of economic evolution without recourse to Darwinian con-
cepts. He tried to achieve this by focusing on entrepreneurial innovations and their 
diffusion.  
 However, Schumpeter fell short of realizing the potential of his ingenious insight 
which could have led him to recognize the emergence and dissemination of novelty as 
generic features of evolution. With a somewhat artificial distinction between invention 
and innovation, and the assumption that inventions are always already given, he stop-
ped half way in his investigation of endogenously generated economic change. By re-
fusing to consider inventions -- or, more generally, novelty -- more closely, an expla-
nation of how knowledge is created, and why, is made exogenous to Schumpeter’s 
theory. By the same token, the question of whether a feed-back between search, dis-
covery, experimentation, and adoption of new possibilities (and the respective motiva-
tions) exists is excluded. Moreover, perhaps as a tribute to the debate on Marxism, 
Schumpeter chose to cast what he called his “developmental method” in terms of a 
theory of unsteady capitalist development, i.e. of business cycle theory. When he dis-
cussed how entrepreneurs carry out innovations and, by doing so induce development 
“from within the economy”, the upshot of his discussion was that these innovative ac-
tivities occur in regular cyclical patterns of economic growth. 
 For reasons discussed elsewhere (Witt 2002), Schumpeter was unable to establish 
what could have been a Schumpeterian evolutionary school. It was only in a more re-
cent manifesto by Nelson and Winter (1982) -- which triggered a new wave of evolu-
tionary economics (Nelson 1995) -- that his ideas about capitalist development have 
been revived. Remarkably enough, in this revival, his ideas are blended with Darwi-
nian conceptions -- despite Schumpeter’s own rejection of any analogies to Darwinian 
thought. This is an obvious tribute to the above mentioned increasing impact which 
(neo-) Darwinian evolutionary biology has had as “the” model of an evolutionary 
science. This impact is also visible in the recent surge of interest of economists in 
evolutionary game theory which originated from evolutionary biology2.  
 It may therefore be asked at this point how pertinent Darwinian thought is for 
coming to grips with evolution in the economic domain. The answer to this question 
is complicated by the fact that there are many possible ways of referring to Darwinian 
thought. One point in which the diverse ways differ is their ontological foundation. In 
fact, there seem to be only two alternative ontological positions. Either evolutionary 
economics is assumed to share its ontological basis with neo-Darwinian evolutionary 
biology or the idea of a common ontological basis is (often implicitly) rejected. Pro-
minent examples of the latter position are the various attempts to construction analo-
gies to, and the metaphorical uses of, Darwinian concepts to be discussed now in mo-
                                                   
2 Cf. Maynard Smith (1982). Symptomatic of the current situation in economics, the  development in evolutionary ga-
me theory is entirely disconnected from the revival of Schumpeterian evolutionary economics. No attempt is ma-
de to identify a common ontological basis as is clearly brought out in a recent symposium on evolutionary econo-
mics (Bergstrom 2002, Nelson and Winter 2002, Robson 2002, Samuelson 2002). In fact, few attempts are made 
at all in evolutionary game theory to explicate the relevance of this theory for economics. For notable exceptions 
cf. Binmore (1998) and Young (1998). 
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re detail. Examples of differing versions of the former position will be considered in 
later sections. 
 A popular strategy for pursuing Darwinian ideas for heuristic purposes is the cons-
truction of analogies. Without pretending to imply any commonality at the ontological 
level, analogies are drawn between principles of evolution in the biological domain on 
the one hand and the economic domain on the other. However, because of obvious 
differences between the two domains, analogies rarely really hold. Other than by way 
of a (probably unnoticed) mistaken analogy, the actual use made of Darwinian con-
cepts in evolutionary economics is therefore often only a metaphorical one. This 
means borrowing Darwinian concepts to conceive and express conjectures about evo-
lution in the economic domain. Particularly popular is the recourse to the selection 
metaphor (see below). The value of these heuristic strategies is difficult to assess in 
general. The potentially fruitful heuristic of a metaphor has to be weighed against the 
potential perils of being attracted to, and trapped in, mistaken analogies which may 
then for long time be difficult to correct. The way in which Darwinian concepts have 
been made part of neo-Schumpeterian evolutionary economics illustrates the pros and 
cons.  
 In the 1950s a first debate about “economic natural selection” started in the con-
text of rivaling hypotheses about the pricing setting behavior of firms (Alchian 1950, 
Penrose 1952). These hypotheses either postulated profit maximizing behavior or so-
me form of non-maximization. Observational problems prevented a conclusive dis-
crimination between the rivaling hypotheses being made on an empirical basis. The 
question was therefore raised as to whether a logical argument for discriminating bet-
ween the alternative hypotheses could be derived from an analogy to natural selection. 
The basic rationale that was proposed assumed that, under conditions of competitive 
markets, all forms of non-maximizing firm behavior would fall victim to selection for-
ces. However, the profit level that actually suffices to survive in a particular market at 
a particular time hinges on the behavior of the competitors -- a dependency called 
“occupancy effect” in the biological analogue. No analogue to a genetic continuity 
being present in the highly volatile pricing behavior of firms, the occupancy effect in 
this context hinges on a large number of situational factors so that, as a survival crite-
rion, profitability says very little (cf. Winter 1964, Metcalfe 2003). In this context, 
“economic natural selection” is therefore a rather superficial metaphor of uncertain 
heuristic value. 
 Nonetheless, it has also been used in the “loose analogy” (as they call it) in Nelson 
and Winter’s (1982) revival of Schumpeterian evolutionary economics. Informed by 
the notion of bounded rationality, they argue (ibid., Chap. 5) that in their internal inte-
ractions organizations are based on behavioral routines, rules of thumb, and regular 
interaction patterns. Production planning, calculation, price setting, and even the allo-
cation of research and development funds, are all seen as following routine and rule-
bound behavior. Borrowing the Darwinian notions, the firms’ routines are then inter-
preted as “genotypes” and the specific decisions resulting from the applied routines as 
“phenotypes”. The latter are supposed to affect the firms’ overall performance.  
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 Different routines and different decisions are assumed to imply differences in the 
firms’ growth. On the assumption that routines which successfully contribute to 
growth are not changed, the actual expansion is interpreted as an increase in relative 
frequency of those “genes-routines”, while routines which cause a deteriorating per-
formance are unlikely to expand. Their relative frequency is therefore supposed to de-
cline. Analogously to the principles of natural selection, the changing composition of 
behavioral routines within an industry is thus considered to be a significant instance of 
economic evolution. Yet, there is little to support the assumption that there are suffi-
cient inertia in this development for the selection mechanism to effect systematic 
changes. The reason is that it is most likely that firms facing deteriorations will be in-
duced to identify the deficient routines and to replace or improve them in a kind of in-
tentionally produced mutation of their “genes” 3.  
 Indeed, a more general limitation of the analogy between natural selection and 
“economic natural selection” turns up here. In the genetic context, selective forces 
operate on a given population and change the relative frequencies of the genes in the 
pool. The individual members of the population have little, if any, room for escaping 
from these pressures or for adjusting to them. In this sense, selection forces may be 
labeled “external”. In a similar way, the anonymous competitive forces of the markets 
can be seen as external to the individual. The market participants unintentionally im-
pose constraints on each other in their multilateral interactions, and these constraints 
may even force some of them out of business. Thus the population of agents on the 
supply and/or demand sides of a market may systematically change over time. But, 
unlike in the genetic case, the agents are not helpless when exposed to these changes. 
In fact, the systematic changes observable in markets may be attributed to a large ex-
tent to the individuals’ attempts to anticipate the effects of the market forces and to 
take account of them. If successful, the effects of “external” selection are replaced by 
what would have to be labeled “internal” selection.  
 The deliberate, discretionary character of behavior adaptation in the economy has 
no equivalent in the domain of genetically coded behavior considered in evolutionary 
biology. The notion of natural selection therefore runs the risk of inducing a mislea-
ding heuristic which fails to (sufficiently) acknowledge a genuine feature of economic 
evolution -- the role played by learning and cognition. 4 Cognitive processes like hy-
                                                   
3 Nelson and Winter (ibid.) argue that such improvement or replacement activities are themselves subject to higher 
routines, and that the differential growth argument therefore applies once again. It may indeed be that firms acti-
vate higher problem solving routines on a regular basis when a crisis occurs or is expected to occur. Yet, the out-
come of these problem solving routines is often more likely to depend on whose problem solving capacity is in-
volved in those routines than on the routines themselves. In this case, the differential success of the problem sol-
ving process triggered cannot be derived from differences in those routines. Differential success is basically un-
predictable (much like mutation in the genetic sphere). When different people are involved in the same routines at 
different times, development may be different. The inertia in what has been suggested as the analogue of the selec-
tion mechanism is lost.  
4 The individuals’ capacity to anticipate consequences of their behavior and to take account of them deliberately by 
searching for better solutions may be interpreted as a case of Lamarckian rather than Darwinian evolution (Nelson 
and Winter 1982, p.11). Allowing for a direct feedback from the phenotypic performance to genotypic traits is said 
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pothesis formation and learning from insight are likely to produce adaptations which 
follow their own regularities. Emerging from a limited human information processing 
capacity -- which means that people are constrained in what they sense, learn, and per-
ceive -- the regularities reflect mental processes which in both their dynamics and their 
outcome are not necessarily the same as the process of genetic selection. 
III. Generic Features of Evolution 
The social sciences have an independent, pre-Darwinian tradition of evolutionary 
thought (cf. Hayek 1967a; for its influence on Darwin, cf. Richards 1992). Social phi-
losophers and lawyers of the eighteenth and nineteenth century reflected on what 
would nowadays be called “cultural evolution”. Some of this thought had strong nor-
mative connotations, equating societal evolution with progress in some sense. 5 How-
ever, this entire tradition is largely forgotten today. The intellectual impact of Darwin’s 
thought has been so strong that the notion of evolution is now almost exclusively as-
sociated with the meaning given to it in evolutionary biology. As discussed in the 
previous section, attempts at conceptualizing evolution in the domain of the social 
sciences make use of doubtful analogies and metaphors borrowed from evolutionary 
biology rather than reflecting on proper domain-specific concepts of their own. This 
intellectual habit coincides (and is occasionally mixed up with) an attitude cultivated in 
the post-Darwinian natural philosophy of claiming general empirical relevance for the 
Darwinian conception of evolution under the heading of “Universal Darwinism” 
(Dawkins 1983).  
 As the label indicates, Universal Darwinism suggests applying Darwinian notions 
as general tools for explaining evolutionary phenomena wherever such phenomena are 
thought to be present. In practice this may not appear much different from the bo-
rrowing of concepts discussed in the previous section. Yet, the ontological presump-
tion is a different one. It is claimed that the general applicability of certain Darwinian 
concepts rests on the fact that they represent the generic features of evolution. What 
are the concepts considered generally valid by Universal Darwinism? A frequently ci-
ted list has been given by Campbell (1965). He suggested the interactive concepts of 
variation, selection, and retention or replication of competing variants from a popula-
tion of variants. Similarly, Dawkins (1986) speaks of “replicators” like genes or “me-
mes” as units of selection whose variation and selective multiplication are behind all 
forms of evolution on this planet.  
 There is no doubt that these concepts -- gained by abstraction from the neo-
Darwinian synthesis in evolutionary biology -- characterize very general features of 
                                                                                                                                 
to imply a “Lamarckian” -- rather than Darwinian -- theory of evolution (Knudsen 2001).  Note, however, that 
hardly any Lamarckian population dynamics have ever been worked out and studied in the sciences and that, unli-
ke those of an analogy to the advanced Darwinian dynamics, the implications (and the benefits) of an analogy to 
Lamarckian interpretations are therefore unclear. 
5 A special variant are theories of evolution in which society goes through a sequence of progressive stages as, e.g., in 
Marxian historical materialism. The problems of these theories are well known from the criticism articulated in 
Popper (1960). 
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evolution in nature. 6 But, as abstract reductions of the Darwinian principles, they are 
still domain-specific. Per se there is little reason to believe that principles derived by an 
isolated abstraction from evolution in one domain do indeed carry over to evolution 
in other domains. The proposition that the population based principles of variation, 
selection, and replication are generic to all forms of evolution -- evolution in nature as 
much as cultural evolution, say -- is not self-evident. Conclusive empirical support for 
the alleged general relevance of the abstract Darwinian principles has not yet been 
provided. It may therefore be argued that their application to the non-biological do-
main (such as the economic domain) is actually only yet another attempt to construct 
analogies -- just more abstract ones. Indeed, several of the concrete objections to the 
attempted analogies raised in the previous section may be repeated similarly here. 
 To give an example, consider the relationship between selection and variation. In 
evolutionary biology the absence of a systematic feedback between selection and va-
riation is a test criterion for Darwin’s theory. In the economic domain this is different. 
The comparatively recent achievements of intelligence and codified knowledge often 
allow people to invent their way out when threatened by selection forces. Such a feed-
back would have to be given the status of a systematic feature of adaptation, if adap-
tion were to be cast in terms of an interplay between selection and variation. The con-
sequences of this difference with respect to the character and the pace of the adaptive 
process are dramatic. The meaning of both selection and variation would actually have 
to change significantly when going from one domain to the other. Similar objections 
could be raised against the Darwinian assumption of “blindness” or randomness of 
the variation process which does not do justice to human intuition and creativity. 
Hence, even at a very abstract level, it is hard to see how analogies suggested by Uni-
versal Darwinism can hold.  
 This is not to say, however, that the idea of identifying generic features of evolu-
tion -- which is a good part of the motivation underlying Universal Darwinism -- is 
mistaken. This idea is based on the ontological assumption of some commonalities 
shared by all forms of evolution. What has just been criticized is neither the basic idea 
nor its underlying ontological presumption, but the particular way of trying to realize 
the idea: the abstract reduction of Darwinian principles does not lead to generic featu-
res of evolution. To identify the latter, an attempt needs to be made to transcend all 
domain-specific characteristics by abstracting from specific forms of evolution in se-
veral domains. The question thus is, by what features can evolution be characterized if 
its particularities in, say, nature, in human culture in general, or in the human economy 
in particular, are recognized. 
 The social philosopher John Morley (1874) argued long ago that “evolution is not a 
force but a process, not a cause but a law”. Of course there are forces driving the pro-
cess of evolution and causes playing a role in it. But Morley is right in claiming that 
these are not constituent features of evolution. Constituents rather are the dynamically 
unfolding character and the lawfulness, i.e. regularity, of the changes brought about by 
                                                   
6 They abstract, among other things, from the principles of descent and speciation which figure prominently in Dar-
win’s original understanding, cf. Mayr (1991, Chap.4).  
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evolution wherever it occurs. However, Morley’s two properties are not sufficient. 
There are many processes which display regularities that are not evolutionary, e.g. the 
stochastic process describing the motion of a particle suspended in a liquid, known as 
Brownian motion. Thus, evolution is more than just dynamics. As has been explained 
in detail elsewhere (Witt 1987, Chap. 1), the crucial qualification that makes dynamics 
an evolutionary dynamics is the emergence and dissemination of novelty in the evolutio-
nary process. To put it differently, evolution is always a process that has the capacity 
of expanding its state space through the generation of not previously existing states. 
Hence, the generation of novelty is generic to all cases of evolution.  
 On this basis, evolution can be defined in an abstract way as the self-
transformation over time of a system under consideration. In this definition, the term 
“transformation” means a process of change governed by regularities. 7 The prefix in 
“self-transformation” points to the endogenous sources and causes of novelty. For 
epistemological reasons it is useful to split self-transformation into two logically, and 
usually also ontologically, distinct processes: the emergence and the dissemination of 
novelty. With the emergence and dissemination of novelty, it is submitted here, the 
generic, domain-unspecific features of evolution have been identified. The two featu-
res materialize in quite different forms in the different disciplines. In biology, we have 
random mutation and genetic recombination on the one hand and selective replication 
in the gene pool of a population on the other. In linguistics, to take that example, the 
invention of new idioms marks the emergence part and their popularization the dis-
semination part. In the economic domain, given that discipline’s focus on human ac-
tion, novelty is usually seen as emerging from a newly discovered possibility for action 
which, once taken, is called an innovation. However, any attempt to innovate is likely 
to trigger learning and be accompanied by it. When the news of the innovation 
spreads the innovation can disseminate by imitative learning.  
IV. Some Methodological Implications 
The generic features of emergence and dissemination of novelty help to understand 
the epistemological problems which all evolutionary theories face -- independent of 
their disciplinary domains. By novelty’s very nature, its meaning, and hence its future 
consequences, cannot be completely anticipated. In a deliberate search for a particular 
novelty, e.g. a solution to a specific problem, it may appear possible to define ex ante 
necessary conditions which any solution must satisfy. But those necessary conditions 
rest on the current understanding of the problem. In many cases, the novelty or in-
vention actually discovered re-frames the understanding of the problem. Ex post, the 
corresponding problem-shift then renders the ex ante postulated necessary conditions 
                                                   
7 Note that the choice of the term “system” is not meant to necessarily imply a system-theoretic interpretation of evo-
lution as suggested by Luhmann and others (cf. Hutter 1994). Rather, it is just a dummy for the different discipli-
nary objects that evolve: nature in the case of biology, language in the case of linguistics, society in the case of so-
ciology, or the economy in the case of economics. From a physical point of view, as living systems, all evolving 
entities depend on free energy being accessible to them to maintain their life functions. Availability of free energy 
is therefore also a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for their further evolution. 
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obsolete or irrelevant. Moreover, even if this is not the case, ex ante formulated neces-
sary conditions cannot cover all properties of the novel solution -- otherwise it would 
no longer be novelty. Some features, perhaps important ones, cannot positively be an-
ticipated. (The many, often only much later discovered, negative side effects of tech-
nological innovations are a case in point.) This trivial fact is responsible for the cons-
trained predictive power of all evolutionary theories. Because of novelty’s very nature, 
the outcome of evolution cannot be positively anticipated. Yet, since it is possible to 
derive hypotheses that exclude the occurrence of certain kinds of novelty some testable 
propositions do always seem feasible 8-- though they usually imply rather weak predic-
tions.  
 If the epistemological constraint is taken seriously, what are the implications? As 
discussed elsewhere (Witt 1987, Chap. 1; 1993), evolutionary theory faces two diffe-
rent kinds of explanatory problem with strongly differing epistemological connota-
tions. The first is to provide explanations for phenomena and conditions without 
knowing the meaning of the next emerging novelty (“pre-revelation analysis”). The se-
cond kind of problem is to explain what happens once novelty has revealed its mea-
ning (“post-revelation analysis”). Roughly speaking, this distinction corresponds to the 
two tasks of any theory of evolution. The first task is to explain how, and under what 
conditions, novelty is being generated within the domain of a theory. The second task 
is to explain what happens as a consequence of novelty having emerged within the 
domain. The “epistemological boundary” between the problem of emergence and the 
problem of dissemination not only establishes the constraints on the predictive power 
of evolutionary theories, but it also implies differing methodological options for the 
different explanatory tasks.  
 The bulk of explanatory efforts usually focuses on the second task. 9 These expla-
nations are indeed much less complicated. This is particularly so under two widely 
used idealizing assumptions. One assumption is that all relevant properties of a newly 
generated novelty are already known to the scientific observer. The other assumption 
is that no further novelty will intervene in the post-revelation analysis. Under these 
two assumptions, novelty is factually removed from the period of analysis, and its oc-
currence and revelation is shifted to the antecedent conditions. Under these condi-
tions, the effects triggered by an exogenously given novelty can often be described 
mathematically by means of ordinary difference or differential equations and their de-
rivatives and solutions. Since there are hardly any mathematical concepts for the 
emergence of novelty and virtually no algorithmic basis for solving the meaning attri-
                                                   
8 Take, to use the example given by Hayek (1967b), the neo-Darwinian theory of evolution. Because of the complexity 
of the genetic recombinatory process there is no way for it to positively anticipate all properties of future genera-
tions. But the theory definitely excludes certain novelties from occurring. Even if a forepaw of parent dogs were 
to be amputated over several generations, the theory predicts that no puppy will ever be born that has no forepaw. 
However arbitrary this hypothesis may appear on first sight, it offers the possibility for a test that discriminates 
between Darwin’s theory and the rivaling Lamarckian hypothesis of the heredity of acquired traits.  
9 This is even true in evolutionary biology, where the lion’s share of theorizing deals with what may be classified as 
“selection” and “retention” processes according to the scheme of Campbell (1965). The production of genetic 
novelty by mutation and recombination (“variation”) is a comparatively special topic.  
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bution problem (cf. the discussion in Egidi 1992), this condition defines the presently 
binding boundary for mathematical modeling in evolutionary economics.  
 For analyzing the effects and characteristic phenomena of dissemination processes, 
formal modeling is useful. In fact, many implications can otherwise hardly be deri-
ved10. As discussed in Witt (1992), these phenomena include frequency-dependency 
effects and occupancy effects. Furthermore, there are effects of critical mass thres-
holds and lock-in effects. These effects often occur as “emerging properties”, which is 
to say that they only turn up if, in the evolutionary process, certain ranges of parame-
ter values are exceeded. These dynamic phenomena help in understanding the peculiar 
coexistence of two apparently conflicting ideas in evolutionary theories. On the one 
hand there is a belief in general procedural regularities. On the other hand, there can 
be no doubt about the historical specificity of the evolutionary process. Can regularity 
and historicity go together? A tentative answer could be: even if history is made up of 
a sequence of unique episodes, in these episodes, and in the transition between them, 
something can repeat itself, i.e. regularities can occur. Regularities may reside in lear-
ning and imitation phenomena, in diffusion and selection phenomena, and even in the 
very generation of novelty. Among the recurrent features one can expect, for example, 
frequency-dependency and occupancy effects, critical mass and lock-in effects. This is 
to say on the one hand that nomological knowledge by means of which at least some 
aspects of historical particularities can be explained is feasible. On the other hand, the 
evolutionary process in its entirety is “irrevocable” (Georgescu-Roegen 1971, pp.196-
197). It cannot repeat itself identically even though, as a consequence of its regularity, 
it may display some recurrent patterns.  
V. Ontological Claims: the Continuity Hypothesis 
In the previous section some generic features which are supposed to characterize evo-
lution -- the emergence and dissemination of novelty -- have been discussed. This 
means that all domain-specific evolutionary processes are expected to share these fea-
tures and some abstract principles that may follow. At the ontological level, this im-
plies that all evolutionary processes have something in common without necessarily 
being connected to one another. Indeed, whether or not there are also (inter-) depen-
dencies between the various domain-specific processes of evolution, or whether some 
of them even refer to the same phenomena in reality, is a different ontological ques-
tion. It is the subject of this section. In order to discuss it, two further views of how 
Darwinian evolutionary biology and, for that matter, evolutionary economics, relate at 
the ontological level will be surveyed. 
                                                   
10 Examples in evolutionary economics are individual learning, imitation, and the resulting collective dynamics.  As 
Brenner (1999) shows, they can be represented by diffusion processes on the basis of some version of the master 
equation. In some cases, the replicator dynamics equation (now popular in evolutionary game theory, cf. Hofbauer 
and Sigmund 1988, Chap. 4) which gives an abstract account also of selection processes can be used. 
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 The first, and most radical, view assumes that the neo-Darwinian theory of natural 
selection can be extended to also explain economic behavior of modern man.11 Thus, 
the ontological basis of evolutionary economics, evolutionary biology in general, and 
sociobiology in particular is assumed to be essentially the same. By implication, the 
emergence and dissemination of novelty would have to be understood as referring to 
the genetic level only. The justification for this assumption may be sketched as fo-
llows. Economic phenomena result from human behavior. Humans are themselves a 
product of natural selection. Accordingly, the Darwinian theory of evolution may be 
considered directly relevant to the explanation of human economic behavior. Obser-
vable economic behavior should therefore be explicable in terms of its contribution to 
genetic fitness.  
 The problem with such an explanation is, of course, that it would be valid only if 
selection pressure on humans is still tight enough for deviations from the best fit be-
havior (in terms of reproductive success) to be wiped out. While this may be a reaso-
nable working hypothesis for early, primitive economies, the conditions in the much 
more productive modern economies seem to be different. Indeed, in the latter, the 
most significant part of the adaptations in economic behavior usually occur within one 
generation, i.e. at a pace much more rapid than that of inter-generational, genetic ad-
aptation. These adaptations reflect the emergence and dissemination of novelty at the 
cultural level: ideas, practices, habits, artefacts etc. They result from the evolutionary 
dynamics of learning and insight which are inaccessible to the neo-Darwinian theory 
of natural selection.  
 The second view, advocated by the present author (cf. Witt 1987, Chap. 3; 1991; 
1996; 1999), is epitomized by what may be called the “continuity hypothesis”. In this 
view, the fact that humans and their “hardwired” endowment are a result of natural 
selection also figures prominently. However, these genetic endowments are conside-
red as only setting the stage for yet other forms of evolution which have emerged un-
der the influence of the unfolding human culture. They follow their own regularities 
and interact both among themselves and with natural evolution in an increasingly ri-
cher and more complex way. This means that an ontological continuity over time is 
assumed in which new forms of change have been generated within the freedom left 
by the constraints of Darwinian theory -- and, hence, without invalidating that theory.  
 Under natural selection, innate dispositions and adaptation mechanisms and pro-
grams in humans have been shaped which define the basic behavioral repertoire upon 
which other forms of evolution rest. In the early phases of human culture it is likely 
that the two forms of evolution have interacted. However, the synergisms between the 
natural and cultural results of natural selection eventually allowed forms of human be-
havior to emerge which had a strong relative reproductive success compared to other 
species (Corning 1983). As a consequence, selection pressure was significantly reduced 
                                                   
11 Cf., e.g., Hermann-Pillath (1991), Rubin (1982), Robson (2001); for a critical view cf. Witt (1985) and Hallpike 
(1996). A modified version of this strategy has informed anthropological research under the label of the co-
evolution hypothesis. It is argued that cultural behavior in primitive societies can be explained by the joint fitness 
value of genetic and cultural traits, cf. Durham (1976), Boyd and Richerson (1994). 
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and man’s genetic endowment has remained much the same since then. The more se-
lection pressure faded, the less systematically selected was behavior which contributed 
to genetic fitness. Behavioral variety could increase and include variants which had lit-
tle or no adaptive value. This gave room for human culture, institutions, and advances 
in economy and technology to evolve according to their own regularities. These regu-
larities are compatible with, and build on, the fact that the innate individual disposi-
tions and adaptation mechanisms are still in place.  
 Thus, the continuity hypothesis postulates a historical transition. “The origin of the 
species by means of natural selection”, as Darwin (1859) put it, is that form of evolu-
tion occuring in reality which antedates, in historical time, other forms of evolution 
considered here. It is exclusively characterized by the emergence and dissemination of 
novelty at the genetic level. But this has shaped the ground, and still defines the cons-
traints, for man-made, or cultural, evolution. A plurality of partly interactive evolutio-
nary processes could thus develop in which novelty of very different quality emerges 
and disseminates at diverse levels. Darwinian theory is directly relevant for understan-
ding both the origin of economic evolution in human phylogeny and continuing in-
fluence of innate elements on human economic behavior. Yet, in the further course of 
economic evolution, human behavior and, correspondingly, economic activities and 
their collective outcomes underwent a metamorphosis into the distinct, idiosyncratic 
forms observable in present-day economies. To explain the emergence of the latter, 
Darwinian theory is not sufficient. What is needed in addition are theories which ex-
plain the several facets of cultural evolution. 
 The continuity hypothesis just specified has important implications for a broadly 
conceived research program in evolutionary economics. To give an example: the hy-
pothesis suggests ways substance can be added to the theory of human preferences 
which, by and large, has been treated until now as a “black box” in economics. To es-
cape from the unnecessarily agnostic preference subjectivism in modern economic 
theory and to reconstruct and explain some objective features of revealed human pre-
ferences, recourse can be taken to the remnants of the different, simultaneously opera-
ting forms of evolution: the genetic dispositions, the behaviorally reinforced attitudes, 
and the cognitively acquired knowledge and beliefs. The resulting theory (cf. Witt 
2001) explains how human preferences emerge from some innate dispositions and 
non-cognitive learning mechanisms, and how their revelation is affected by socially 
shared cognitive frames and subjective experience. 
 To give another example: the proposed continuity hypothesis allows us to better 
come to grips with the evolutionary change in the constraints on human productive 
and consumptive activities. At present, economic theory reflects on these constraints 
only in an extremely abstract form, namely, to the extent to which they affect the 
transformation of unspecified inputs into unspecified outputs in anthropogenic pro-
duction. The continuity hypothesis offers a more concrete approach (cf. Witt 2003). 
Since evolution in nature has defined the constraints for what can evolve elsewhere, 
the changing production forms in human phylogeny can easily be reconstructed 
against that background. The crucial effect of cultural evolution that comes to the fore 
here is not so much the economizing on scarce resources (which is usually emphasi-
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zed in economics), but rather the cumulative problem solving and knowledge genera-
tion on the one side, and a successive creation of new problems on the other. On ba-
lance, the human economy’s growing capacity to generate, apply, and improve cultural 
knowledge has up to now increasingly allowed the natural constraints on human eco-
nomic activity to be slackened. 
 A significant feature worth mentioning is the massively enhanced access to free 
energy, particularly fossil energy resources. The increasing release of large parts of the 
human society from being limited to the age-old uses of human time for physical work 
has enabled humankind to generate and apply ever more knowledge -- a kind of auto-
catalytic cycle (cf. Buenstorf 2000). It has allowed the niche for the human species to 
be enlarged, at least temporarily. Moreover, the command over natural resources has 
increased dramatically for almost all its members currently alive. (In economic growth 
theory these consequences are usually reflected by growing per capita income world-
wide and unprecedented increases in labor productivity.) On the other hand, the evo-
lutionary process that has produced these amenities has also triggered developments 
with an uncertain, and possibly highly problematic, longer term impact on nature, the 
ultimate foundation of the human economy. Unfortunately, the epistemological 
boundary discussed in the previous section prevents us from making predictions of 
the meaning of future new knowledge. How the balance between problem solving and 
problem generating will develop in the future is therefore unknown. It is a matter, al-
ternatively, of optimistic hopes or pessimistic fears. 
VI. Conclusions 
An attempt has been made here to clarify the generic features of evolution and some 
of the implications that follow from these features. The attempt was motivated by the 
fact that evolution is believed to occur in many disciplines. As a tribute to the intellec-
tual attraction of the neo-Darwinian theory of evolution, the evolutionary processes in 
other domains are often also conceptualized in terms of Darwinian concepts. Some 
modern Darwinists even propagate the concepts of variation, selection, and replica-
tion as universally applicable. However, as has been argued, when it comes to making 
sense of evolution in non-biological domains, recourse to Darwinian concepts is neit-
her a necessary heuristic strategy nor is it always a helpful one. There are good reasons 
to search for generic features of evolution in a way that transcends all domain-specific 
characteristics. These reasons have been discussed and a way of identifying generic 
features has been pointed out. Two concrete generic features have been suggested and 
some of their implications, which are relevant for analyzing evolution in all domain-
specific manifestations, have been outlined. 
 Finally, an attempt has been made to confront the findings with an issue that 
seems of some importance for the post-Darwinian natural philosophy. How does the 
idea that various forms of evolution have emerged in different domains fit the Darwi-
nian world view? And, accordingly, how can the various domain-specific evolutionary 
theories such as, for instance, evolutionary economics, be accommodated by the 
world view of the moderns sciences which is strongly influenced by the neo-
Darwinian theory of evolution? The answer that has been suggested is a specific onto-
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logical claim which has been dubbed the “continuity hypothesis”. The hypothesis does 
attribute relevance to the neo-Darwinian theory of evolution for explaining evolutio-
nary phenomena in non-biological disciplinary domains such as the economic domain. 
Hence it subscribes to a Darwinian world view. However, unlike in some contribu-
tions inspired by sociobiology, the relevance does not lie in its direct applicability to 
explaining the evolution of economic behavior. Nor is the relevance that of a master 
theory which provides abstract tools, as Universal Darwinism has it. Instead, the rele-
vance of neo-Darwinian theory rather is the following. It is the theory that explains 
how the basis has been generated and constraints are still shaped for those forms of 
evolution which have emerged later under the influence of the unfolding human cul-
ture. The human economy and its tremendous historical change is a congenial exam-
ple.  
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Alchian, A.A. (1950). “Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory”, Journal of Political Economy 58, 211-
221. 
Bergstrom, T.C. (2002). “Evolution of Social Behavior: Individual and Group Selection”, Journal of Econo-
mic Perspectives 16, 67-88. 
Binmore, K. (1994). Playing Fair - Game Theory and the Social Contract I. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
_____ (1998). Just Playing - Game Theory and the Social Contract II. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Boyd, R, and Richerson, P.J. (1994). “The Evolution of Norms: An Anthropological View”, Journal of Ins-
titutional and Theoretical Economics 150, 72-87. 
Brenner, T. (1999). Modelling Learning in Economics. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Buenstorf, G. (2000). “Self-organization and Sustainability: Energetics of Evolution and Implications for 
Ecological Economics”, Ecological Economics 33, 119-134.  
Campbell, D.T. (1965). “Variation and Selective Retention in Socio-cultural Evolution”, in Barringer, 
H.R., Blankstein, G.I., Mack, R.W. (eds.). Social Change in Developing Areas: A Re-interpretation of Evolu-
tionary Theory. Cambridge, MA: Schenkman, 19-49.  
Corning, P.A. (1983). The Synergism Hypothesis: A Theory of Progressive Evolution. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Darwin, C. (1859). On the Origin of the Species by Means of Natural Selection or the Preservation of Favored Races in 
the Struggle of Life. London: John Murray. 
Dawkins, R. (1983). “Universal Darwinism”, in Bendall, D.S. (ed.). Evolution from Molecules to Man. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 403-425. 
_____ (1986). The Blind Watchmaker. Harlow: Longman. 
Durham, W.H. (1976). “The Adaptive Significance of Cultural Behavior”, Human Ecology 4, 89-121. 
Egidi, M. (1992). “Organizational Learning, Problem Solving and the Division of Labor”, in Egidi, M., 
Marris, R. (eds.). Economics, Bounded Rationality and the Cognitive Revolution. Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 
148-173. 
Georgescu-Roegen, N. (1971). The Entropy Law and the Economic Process. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press. 
Hallpike, C.R. (1996). “Social Evolution”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 152, 682-689. 
Hawkins, M. (1997). Social Darwinism in European and American Thought, 1860-1945. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Hayek, F.A. (1967a). “Dr. Bernhard Mandeville”, Proceedings of the British Academy 12, London: Oxford 
University Press. 
_____ (1967b). “The Theory of Complex Phenomena”, in Hayek, F.A. Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Eco-
nomics. Routledge & Kegan Paul, 22-42. 
Hermann-Pillath, C. (1991). “A Darwinian Framework for the Economic Analysis of Institutional Chan-
ge in History”, Journal of Social and Biological Structures 14, 127-148. 
Hodgson, G.M. (1999). Evolution and Institutions. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Generic Features of Evolution and Its Continuity: A Transdisciplinary Perspective 
 
287 
_____ (2001). How Economics Forgot History: The Problem of Historical Specificity in Social Science. London: Rou-
tledge 
Hofbauer, J., Sigmund, K. (1988). The Theory of Evolution and Dynamical Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Hutter, M. (1994). “The Unit that Evolves: Linking Self-Reproduction and Self-Interest”, in Magnussen, 
L. (ed.). Evolutionary and Neo-Schumpeterian Approaches to Economics. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 49-64.  
Knudsen, T. (2001). “Nesting Lamarckism within Darwinian Explanations: Necessity in Economics and 
Possibility in Biology?”, in Laurent, J., Nightingale, J. (eds.). Darwinism and Evolutionary Economics. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 121-159. 
Maynard Smith, J. (1982). Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Mayr, E. (1991). One Long Argument. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Metcalfe, J.S. (2002). “On the Optimality of the Competitive Process: Kimura’s Theorem and Market 
Dynamics”, Journal of Bioeconomics, forthcoming. 
Morley, J. (1874). On Compromise. London: Chapman and Hall. 
Nelson, R.R. (1995). “Recent Evolutionary Theorizing About Economic Change”, Journal of Economic Lite-
rature 33, 48-90. 
Nelson, R.R, Winter, S.G. (1982). An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
_____ (2002). “Evolutionary Theorizing in Economics”, Journal of Economic Perspectives  2, 23-46. 
Penrose, E.T. (1952). “Biological Analogies in the Theory of the Firm”, American Economic Review 42, 804-
819. 
Popper, K. (1960). The Poverty of Historicism. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 2nd edit. 
Richards, R.J. (1992). The Meaning of Evolution: the Morphological Construction and the Ideological Reconstruction of 
Darwin’s Theory. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
Robson, A.J. (2001). “The Biological Basis of Economic Behavior”, Journal of Economic Literature 39, 11-33. 
_____ (2002). “Evolution and Human Nature”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 2, 89-106. 
Rubin, P.H. (1982). “Evolved Ethics and Efficient Ethics”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 3, 
161-174.  
Ruse, M. (1979). The Darwinian Revolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Rutherford, M. (1998). “Veblen’s Evolutionary Programme: A Promise Unfulfilled”, Cambridge Journal of 
Economics 22, 463-477. 
Samuelson, L. (2002). “Evolution and Game Theory”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 2, 47-66. 
Schumpeter, J.A. (1912/34). Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1912; 
first English edition Theory of Economic Development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934.  
Veblen, T. (1898). “Why Is Economics Not an Evolutionary Science?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 12, 
373-397. 
_____ (1899). The Theory of the Leisure Class - An Economic Study of Institutions. New York: MacMillan. 
_____ (1914). The Instinct of Workmanship, and the State of the Industrial Arts. New York: MacMillan. 
Winter, S.G. (1964). “Economic ‘Natural Selection’ and the Theory of the Firm”, Yale Economic Essays 4, 
225-272. 
Witt, U. (1985). “Economic Behavior and Biological Evolution: Some Remarks on the Sociobiology De-
bate”, Journal of Theoretical and Institutional Economics (formerly Zeitschrift fuer die gesamte Staatswissenschaft), 
141, 365-389. 
_____ (1987). Individualistische Grundlagen der evolutorischen Oekonomik. Tuebingen: Mohr-Siebeck. 
_____ (1991). “Economics, Sociobiology, and Behavioral Psychology on Preferences", Journal of Economic 
Psychology 12, 557-573. 
_____ (1992). “Evolutionary Concepts in Economics”, Eastern Economic Journal 18, 405-419. 
_____ (1993). “Emergence and dissemination of Innovations: Some Principles of Evolutionary Econo-
mics”, in: Day, R.H., Chen, P. (eds.). Nonlinear Dynamics and Evolutionary Economics. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 91-100. 
_____ (1996). “A Darwinian Revolution in Economics?”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 152, 
707-715. 
_____ (1999). “Evolutionary Economics and Evolutionary Biology” in: Koslowski, P. (ed.). Sociobiology and 
Bioeconomics. Berlin: Springer, 279-298. 
Ulrich WITT 
 
288 
_____ (2001). “Learning to Consume - A Theory of Wants and the Growth of Demand”, Journal of Evolu-
tionary Economics 11, 23-36. 
_____ (2002). “How Evolutionary is Schumpeter’s Theory of Economic Development?”, Industry and Inno-
vation 9, 7-22. 
_____ (2003). “Production in Nature and Production in the Economy - Second Thoughts about Some Ba-
sic Economic Concepts”.   
Young, P. (1998). Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Social Institutions. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
 
 
Ulrich WITT is the director of the Evolutionary Economics Unit of the Max Planck Institute for Research 
into Economic Systems and professor of economics at the Friedrich Schiller University, both in Jena, 
Germany. He did his Ph.D. in economics at the University of Goettingen in 1979 and finished his habili-
tation at the University of Mannheim in 1985. From 1988-1995 he held a chair in economic theory at 
the University of Freiburg in Germany before he assumed his current position. 
Address: Evolutionary Economics Group, Max-Planck-Institute for Research Into Economic Systems. 
Kahlaische Str. 10, D-07745 Jena, Germany. E-mail: witt@mpiew-jena.mpg.de 
 
 
 
